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1. Introduction 
Over the period 1970-1996, large reductions of government investments were observed in 
OECD countries Privatization and public-sector expenditure constraints have given rise to a 
substantial reduction in public sector investment and to an alteration of the respective 
importance of the private and the public sector in infrastructure investment.. The reduction of 
the share of gross fixed capital formation cannot be attributed to a 'downsizing' of 
government in industrialized countries: total public expenditure is much the same as it was 
30 years ago. Some common factors might explain this evolution of the government 
expenditure's structure. The shrinking of public investment can be explained by the growing 
share of social security transfers and public debt strengthened by very high interest rates in 
public expenditure, which might have crowded out public infrastructure investment. At the 
same time, privatization of number of public enterprises has taken place and realization of 
new infrastructure investments. 
One trend in the economic literature [e.g. Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) and Munnel (1990)] 
supports the argument that more public investment is required to favor economic growth. 
There is evidence that the decline in the US productivity in the 1970s can be explained by 
lower public investment spending. On the basis of these results, an increase of 1%  in the 
public capital stock raises total factor productivity by 0.39% . However, in more recent 
econometric studies [Hulten and Schwab (1994), Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995) and 
Sturm and de Haan (1995)] the previous results are contradicted. 
In order to stimulate infrastructure investment, public authorities search to involve the private 
sector in the creation of new infrastructures. Private investors are in charge of the 
construction and the operation of the infrastructure. W e have to make a distinction between 
contracting-out the provision of infrastructure services and the private financing of 
infrastructure projects [Ridley (1997)]. Contracting-out implies the replacement of public 
suppliers or contractors of a flow of goods or services with private sector contractors of those 
same flows. In contrast, private financing corresponds to the replacement of a capital asset 
owned by the public sector by a flow of services provided by assets owned by the private 
sector. W e will focus on private financing which is closer to pure privatization process. 
The recourse to the private sector to finance and operate infrastructures is often considered 
as a way to improve the ex ante screening and monitoring of the project and to increase 
productive and managerial efficiency. Various additional benefits are expected from the 
recourse to the private sector to realize new infrastructure [Terry (1996)]. In case of cost 
overruns, costs fall on the shareholders or lending institutions for privately finance project 
while in public ownership the public sector has no alternative but to stump up extra costs. 
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2Moreover, public sector has tended to follow higher technical standard or to be 
overengineered in the design of the project while the private investor will search for a 
balance between cost, financial return and risk. Finally, projects managed in the public 
sector are more often subject to changes in specification, which give scope for contractors to 
claim extra cost and inflate their profits. 
This trend to privatization is strengthened by technological innovations in the collection of 
user fees. By allowing to devise financing schemes based on the willingness to pay of users, 
it allows to resort on financing sources for infrastructure investment which are different from 
budgetary expenditures. A public-private partnership will emerge from those evolutions, the 
public authorities having to deal with specific characteristics of infrastructure project (non-
excludable and non-rival up to a certain level) like network or environmental externalities, the 
demand uncertainty and administrative costs associated to the project. However, on the 
other side, if infrastructure privatization is combined with deregulation or liberalization of 
market entry, the resulting level of competition in the provision of services may increase, and 
hence, the market risks associated to the project. 
Private financing has been used for the development of important infrastructure in Europe. In 
the UK, the government has introduced the private finance initiative (PFI) in order to promote 
the construction of new infrastructure. The participation of the private sector in infrastructure 
projects has led to the creation of a new institutional structure. Indeed, a special purpose 
company, called ''the project company'', is set up to realize the infrastructure; the assets of 
the project reverting to the government at the end of the contract. This project company is 
liable for the contractual agreement with the private contractors and the lenders. The 
concession contract defines the contractual obligations of the project company with respect 
to the government. Debt service is met through cash-flows generated by the project itself. It 
means that project financing is typically on a ''non-recourse'' basis, i.e. the lenders will have 
no financial recourse for repayment of their loans against either the project sponsors or the 
government. More precisely, recourse is limited to the project company and its assets (real 
estate, plant and equipment and whatever contractual rights the project company has been 
able to obtain). 
This paper is organized as follows. In the first part, we describe and analyze the institutional 
structure of infrastructure investment involving the private sector. In the second part, we 
analyze the development of private financing in the UK. We try to isolate the nature of the 
incentives of the different players and the efficiency of different institutional structure, i.e. 
long-term contracting versus vertical integration, for the provision of infrastructure services. 
2. The institutional framework of the provision of infrastructure services 
The impacts of private financing of infrastructures have not been really investigated in the 
economic literature. With the exception of the recent works of Martinand (1993) and Walker-
Smith (1995), the consequences of the private sector's participation to infrastructure projects 
have been essentially analyzed by international institutions [e.g. Augenblick and Scott-
Custer (1990)] or by consultants [e.g. Nevitt (1989)]. In this part, we analyze the contractual 
of project financing and the allocation of risks. 
2.1 The basic institutional structure of project financing 
The contractual regime used to regulate the relationship between public authorities and 
private investors is the ''concession'' (similar to Build Own Operate and Transfer2). The 
concession is a form of privatization without direct sales, i.e. ownership will revert back to the 
public sector at the end. Moreover, the government will monitor the realization of the 
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government, the main advantages lie in the relief from having to face the costs of 
construction and in the promise of better project design, construction and operation. Indeed, 
the concession is a contractual agreement whereby a private entrepreneur leases assets for 
service provision from a public authority for an extended period (between 30-50 years). This 
private company, called the project company, is made responsible for financing specified 
fixed investments during the construction. These new assets revert to the public authorities 
at expiration of the contract. The concession gives an exclusive right to the concessionary 
during the construction and operation period . For instance, public authorities can commit 
themselves not to develop alternative infrastructures introducing competition on the market. 
In this institutional framework, the public sector purchases a service not an asset with pre-
defined payment levels. The difference in terms of incentives between public and private 
provision is that in the case of private provision of infrastructure services, the public sector 
only pays for the service he receives and only if the service meets the contractual 
specifications. Compared to other forms of private sector participation like contracting-out, 
the advantage of this institutional structure is to transfer to the same operator the 
construction and the operation of the infrastructure. If the same entity builds and sells the 
services but is only remunerated for successful supply of services, there are no incentives to 
reduce quality even if the consequences do not appear for many years. This contractual 
structure should also reduce incentives to cost over-run or the choice of an inefficient 
technology since future revenues of the operator depend on a flow of suitable quality 
services form the asset. Such beneficial effects will work if revenue streams of the 
infrastructure project were inherently risky for the suppliers. 
The financing of this type of infrastructure project is based on the expected cash-flows and 
not only on the quality of the debtor. The project financing is typically on a ''non-recourse'' 
basis i.e. the lenders will have no financial recourse for repayment of their loans against 
either the project sponsors or the government. Recourse is limited to the project company 
and its assets, i.e. real estate, plant and equipment and whatever contractual rights the 
project company has been able to obtain. Lenders bear the technical, commercial and 
political risks likely to jeopardize the expected flow of cash-flows. Extensive feasibility and 
engineering studies are carried out to have cautious cash-flows forecasting throughout the 
life of the project. However, projects are rarely completely self-supporting such that they 
cannot be financed without any guarantees and safeguards undertaking by the interested 
parties, including sponsors and government. Normally, the government will not provide 
sovereign guarantees or borrow any money on behalf of the sponsors, but support from the 
host government includes assurance of minimum revenues, sharing of project risks,... 
Private promoters preserve their borrowing capacity by keeping off-balance sheet the 
liabilities incurred by the project company. 
During the operation period, the project company (or concessionary) charges prices, tolls, 
fees,... generating cash-flows sufficient to pay the service of the debt and to provide 
dividends to the shareholders of the project company. Two different approaches are used to 
define the pricing structure. The first approach rests on the repayment of fixed costs during 
the operation period, i.e. all charges related to the operation of the infrastructure including 
the financial charges. The repayment of the variable costs is contingent to the supply of the 
infrastructure services. This type of pricing is similar to a ''cost-plus'' contract [in the sense of 
Laffont and Tirole (1993)]. The alternative approach implies that the government commit 
itself to buy a pre-defined quantity of products at a given price. Generally this type of 
contract includes a specific clause compelling the government to compensate the project 
company if the quantities he buys are lower than the level specified in the contract. This 
contract is quite similar to ''fixed-price'' contract. 
42.2 Regulation and public sector intervention 
In infrastructure investment, the government specifies in the concession different public 
service constraints (pricing structure, safety and environmental regulations,...). The 
intervention of the government rests on different arguments: the existence of externalities, 
natural monopoly, public goods and imperfections on the capital market. 
The development of infrastructures generates positive externalities on the economy 
(stimulation of the economic growth, increase in productivity and profitability,...) but it can 
also imposes costs which are not taken into account by the service provider when choosing 
their actions. As a result, the project's social returns exceed its private returns and the 
classical efficiency argument for subsidies applies: a subsidy that closes the gap between 
private and social benefits will prevent the relevant form of infrastructure from being 
undersupplied.
Moreover, many infrastructure services have natural monopoly characteristics, i.e. least-cost 
production requires that only one service providers is active on the market. In this case, the 
government intervention is required as the firm has no incentive to supply consumer at a 
price equal to the marginal cost of production, since relatively high fixed costs implies that 
marginal costs are below average cost on the relevant range of output. In addition, when the 
firm provides a service with imperfect elasticity of demand, the government has to intervene 
in order to avoid that the firm uses its market power to hold output below its welfare-
maximizing level. 
Infrastructure services have often public goods characteristics3, i.e. non-rivalry and non-
exclusion in the consumption of the good. This leads to the well-know free-rider problem 
which can preclude production by the private sector as no consumer would pay for it. 
Another justification for government intervention is the need to offset the imperfections on 
the capital market. These imperfections results from asymmetric information . Even if 
investors could otherwise capture the social returns, incomplete information that leads to 
some form of credit rationing can prevent them from doing so. To cover their risks, private 
investors require higher interest rates which drops out safer projects from the pool of 
projects of the investor. In such cases, a government interest-rate subsidy or guarantee may 
effectively relax the credit rationing. However, as we will see later, this type of governmental 
intervention can weaken the incentive for investors to monitor adequately the project 
company and to prevent private contractors from deliberately inflating construction costs. 
When the government does not provide directly the infrastructure services, subsidies or 
regulation are alternative intervention mechanisms. If we suppose that the government is 
benevolent, i.e. acts on behalf of society, the implementation of an optimal regulation or the 
grant of subsidies can be limited by asymmetric information or incomplete contracting 
problems. Regulation through price mechanism (RPI-X scheme) or rate-of-return involves 
three-way trade-off for the government among allocative efficiency (marginal price closest to 
marginal cost), productive efficiency (cost reduction incentives) and distributional (excess 
profits of the firm due to its information advantage) [see Laffont and Tirole (1993)]. 
For the provision of infrastructure service, government intervention can take different forms. 
Compared to the initial forms of government intervention, we note that financial interventions 
are quite limited. Moreover, nowadays, the project company will not normally gain any title to 
the land in the form of either leasehold or ownership rights, but will simply be granted some 
forms of restrictive licence to use the land specifically for the project during the concession 
period. The present forms of government intervention are the following : 
i the granting of exclusive rights protecting the project company from the competition of 
alternative infrastructure (e.g. Eurotunnel); 
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or ''take-and pay'' contract; 
i the construction of complementary assets to the infrastructure allowing to improve the 
access to this infrastructure (e.g. the development of railway and road infrastructure to 
Eurotunnel); 
i the internalization of the positive externalities generates by the project through land or 
equipment granting and contribution of actors benefiting from the development of the 
infrastructure (e.g. participation of property developers, landowners and shopkeepers 
to the development of the Bristol Light Rail project in recognition of increase in land 
values along the railway's route); 
i indirect financial aid through, for instance, tax holidays or interest bonus (e.g. 
subordinated loan provided by the Malaysian government to develop the North-South 
Highway which could be drawn if the project revenues fell below a projected target 
level); 
i the transfer of revenues from an existing infrastructure to ensure the financing of a 
new project during the construction period (e.g. the transfer of the revenue from two 
existing tunnels crossing the Thames to reduce the debt period during the construction 
and early operational phase for the development of the new Dartford Bridge). 
Even if the provision of government guarantees can be justified by the existence of positive 
externalities or the lower cost of capital incurred by the public sector, the government 
intervention might have adverse effects. First, it reduces the incentives for banks or private 
investors to screen projects carefully. Second, guarantees blunt managerial efficiency in 
particular when the government guarantees against cost overruns. Finally, guarantees 
create contingent liabilities for the government which do not appear in the budget. The type 
of government intervention is crucial in order not to distort the incentive of each stakeholder 
active in the project. For instance, direct subsidies may be better than guarantees since they 
run through the normal budgetary process and may be limited to an amount just large 
enough to make the project attractive to private investors. However, political pressures may 
lead toinefficient subsidies compared to the social benefit of the project. 
2.3 The contractual structure of project financing 
The concession scheme rests on a nexus of contractual relationship between the different 
players involved in the project. The concession agreement involves different actors: 
i public authorities for which the investment is undertaken; 
i the concessionary or the project company; 
i the financial backers: lenders and shareholders; 
i contractors and operators. 
The contractual arrangements are crucial to achieve an optimal sharing of the risks 
associated to project finance between the different parties. The following picture summarizes 
the contractual relationships between these actors. 
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6The private financing of infrastructure requires the implementation of a package of contracts. 
The project agreement (or implementation/concession agreement) is one of the two key 
contracts, with the credit agreement. This contract entitles the project company to build and 
operate the project facility and imposes a number of conditions as to design, construction, 
operation, maintenance, etc... of the project. More precisely, this contract includes the public 
service obligations imposed by the government and fixes the operation period, the payment 
for the usage of the facility, the way in which payments should be effected and so on. 
Moreover, to deal with the tricky problem of windfall profits, a specific clause may be 
included reserving a right for the government to buy out the private sponsors before the end 
of the operation period or to adjust certain terms of the project agreement. Indeed, for 
political reasons, an excessive profitability of the concession may incite the government not 
to respect his initial contractual obligations in order to obtain a lowering of tariffs or the 
termination of the contract. In this case, when the government cannot commit to future 
policies, private investors face the risk of opportunistic behaviour in addition to other types of 
risks (market risks,...). 
The credit agreement includes two elements: the source of financing and the covering of risk 
of non-repayment of loans. The shareholders agreement includes the subscription of the 
share capital and clauses concerning the dividend policy,... The shareholders of the project 
company are normally the private project sponsors (private construction companies, 
equipment suppliers, lenders) and in some cases the government. The construction contract 
is normally a fixed price turnkey contract covering all the work. In some cases, sub-
contracting is realized. The purchase agreement is defined when a government agency is 
the only customer of the infrastructure project. This agreement provides the project company 
with an assurance of a minimum purchase by the government and arranges the pricing 
structure. If the government pays the fees, the project company faces no market risk and is 
assured of sufficient funds to service its debt, cover its projected costs and make a profit. 
The operating and management agreement manages the relationship between the project 
company and a professional operating firm. This agreement defines the operating costs, the 
standard norms of service,... along the operating period. The escrow agreement organizes 
various deposit accounts and the order of benefit sharing. The insurance package includes 
the various insurance policies for the construction and operating phases, required by the 
lenders.
Project finance differs in the nature of the contractual arrangement. For instance, the project 
company can be responsible for the operating phase, like in Eurotunnel, requiring no specific 
O&M agreement with an operating firm. The nature of these different contracts is crucial to 
give appropriate incentives to the different partners. The objectives of the project company 
depend on the interests of its shareholders, e.g. banks vs constructors or/and operators. We 
can expect that there is congruence between the project company and institutional investors, 
i.e. parties who are not otherwise involved in the project. The contractors have an interest to 
limit his equity stake in the project and to inflate construction costs. However, the less equity 
the contractors takes the less control he has over the terms and conditions of the concession 
and on the construction contract. As a result, we observe that contractors reduce their share 
in equity as the project goes forward since their are naturally less concerned with the terms 
and conditions of the operational phase of the project. 
2.4 Sequence of events and risks allocation 
2.4.1 Timing 
The sequence of events for the infrastructure project is the following. The public authorities 
undertake the feasibility study leading to the specification of the concession. The banks 
carries out the financial part of this study and receive a consultant fee. On the basis of the 
feasibility study, the public authorities organize an auction to allocate the project to a 
consortium offering the best guarantees, i.e. reputation, financial viability,... Indeed, the 
7auction is limited to 2 or 3 consortia because only few firms are able to undertake 
infrastructure project requiring important financial resources, specific know-how and so on. 
After the implementation of the project and financial agreements, the concessionary 
undertakes the construction of the infrastructure, either directly or through subcontracting. 
The concessionary operates the infrastructure and uses cash-flows to repay the loan. The 
public authorities become the owner of the infrastructure at the end of the contract. 
We can describe the time line of the project financing in the following way : 
Infrastructure investments are characterized by high level of investment and the specific 
shape of the rentability of the project i.e. positive receipts expected only at middle term. The 
investment of the private contractor is relationship-specific i.e. having a low value outside the 
relationship and being costly for the party which realizes the investment. In such 
circumstances where the investment is sunk when reaching the operating period, private 
investors may be reluctant to invest in such project with high risk-benefit ratio. Public 
authorities also have to perform specific investment for complementary services to ensure 
the success of the project. These investments are presumed to increase the value of the 
project. Infrastructure project can be viewed as two distinct projects. The two first phases 
correspond to a high-risk construction project, the last phase to a relatively low-risk utility 
project. This dual risk profile means that for equity investors, there is generally a high reward 
during the early phase (large capital gains) followed by a lower reward in the latter phase 
(steadily increasing dividend flows). This two-stage profile of infrastructure projects should 
be reflected in the credit facility. 
2.4.2 Allocation of risks 
One expected advantage for the public authorities of private involvement in infrastructure 
project is to achieve a better allocation of risks by transferring some of them to the private 
sector. The need to transfer risks to private operators has been emphasized to secure 
efficiency gains and to compensate for the alleged lower borrowing cost faced by public 
authorities compared to private investors. 
In terms of financing, given the high risk associated to the development phase, the financial 
instrument used at this stage is only equity. In the construction and start-up phase, high risk 
component is associated with large volume of funds needed for the investment. The 
financing includes a mix of equity, subordinated debt, senior debt and guarantees. Lastly, 
the operating phase faces lower risks allowing refinancing with bonds in some cases. 
We can distinguish between two principal types of infrastructure: 
i project where fees are charged directly to the public, the public sector involvement 
being limited to one of monitoring adherence to the contract and renegotiation any 
changes to the service supplied, e.g. roads, bridges or tunnels with many tolled 
customers (Type 1); 
i project when there is a direct or fixed purchase of the infrastructure services by the 
public sector which can either charges the customer (e.g. power, sewage or water 
treatment plants) or not (e.g. prisons,...) (Type 2). 
The extent of the risk transfer differs for each type of project. In type 1's project, there are 
genuine transfer of risk to the private sector. In general, the public sector provides limited 
guarantees or indemnities to cushion the private sector against unexpectedly low levels of 
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8demand or other project failure. For type 2's project, the transfer of risks aims to achieve the 
allocation of risks to the manager best able to manage them. 
In the table 1, we describe the most important risks4 of infrastructure projects and the 
allocation of risks between the private sector and the public sector. We distinguish the 
different phases of a typical infrastructure project - development, construction and operation. 
We focus on the main risks which can be internalized to some extent either by the private or 
the public sector. An optimal risk allocation will require that risk should be borne or 
internalized by the party best able to control the risk or able to bear the risk at lower costs. If 
the public sector grants complete insurance against cost overruns, for instance, the winning 
consortium will have no incentive to control costs and on average they will be too high. 
Table 1 : Allocation of risks in infrastructure project
Type of risks Risks transfer to the private 
sector 
No risks transfer to the private 
sector 
Development phase 
Design risk Full responsibility of the operator for 
ensuring the underlying asset is fit 
for purpose 
Operator provides a service from a 
design defined by the public sector 
which guarantees that the asset will 
be fit for purpose 
Technology or obsolescence risk Payment depending only on the 
achievement of performance 
standard 
Payment is fixed 
Construction phase 
Construction risk Operator not paid until construction 
is realized, must absord all 
variations and pay some penalties 
for delay 
Operator transfers significant 
variations in construction costs to the 
public sector for this latter is not 
responsible 
Regulatory or legislation risk Operator responsible for change in 
law or regulations of general 
application 
Public sector compensates cost 
variation due to specific or general 
legislation changes 
Operation phase 
Performance risk Service payment entirely 
depending on the achievement 
of performance criteria 
Service payment fixed and 
independent of performance 
criteria 
Operating cost risk Operating responsible for all 
variations in operating costs 
Significant changes in operating 
costs passed back to the public 
sector 
Demand or volume risk Payments are volume related Service payment independent of 
volume 
Residual value risk Asset remains with the operator 
or public sector option to acquire 
at market value at the end of the 
contract 
Asset reverts to the public sector 
at the end of the contract at a 
pre-determined value 
Pricing risk Service payment taking the form 
of a pre-determined RPI-X 
Service payment varying with the 
underlying cost base 
Note that we have not considered political, administrative, environmental or force majeure 
risks which essentially remains of the responsibility of the public sector and hence of the 
taxpayers. In some cases, some of those risks can be transferred to consumers rather than 
to the taxpayers when regulatory rules allow changes in taxation or environmental standards 
to be passed on to consumers through tariff adjustments. The efficiency and distributional 
consequence of the choice will depend particularly on the relative effectiveness of the 
taxation system and the infrastructure tariff system. Transferring those risks like political 
risks to private investors will increase the cost of private financing since it will ultimately be 
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9reflected in higher tariffs, reduced proceeds form privatization or greater need for public 
financing in infrastructure. However, even if the public sector bears political risks, those risks 
cannot be completely eradicated and the final outcome will depend on the credibility of the 
commitment of the government to establish effective and durable institutional safeguards for 
private property rights. 
The transfer of the demand and volume risks will depend on the access for users to 
alternative sources for the services provided by the infrastructure. If the demand for the 
service is relatively elastic, the transfer of the volume risk to the private consortium might 
increase the price charged for the service when the volume of usage is largely outside the 
control of the private consortium (e.g. tolled roads versus alternative non-tolled roads). But in 
this case, since demand may be highly sensitive to the quality of the service, the contractor 
must be given incentives to perform demand-enhancing activities implying the need to bear 
commercial risks. When demand is relatively inelastic and unresponsive to the concession-
holder actions, there is no need to transfer demand risk and the government has to enforce 
regulatory mechanism, for instance, the introduction of minimum quality standards. 
The nature of the risks associated to the realization of infrastructure investment depends on 
the type of the project. As stressed before, the advantage of type 2's project are the 
following : less risky revenue streams and construction and maintenance costs relatively 
simple to quantify. For instance, electricity projects rest on technologies which are relatively 
well mastered. In power projects, power purchase agreement or long-term power sales 
contract with a state-owned utility gives extensive guarantees to the lenders. This possibility 
to recover fixed charges (including debt service and equity return) and operating costs is not 
replicable with the same level of guarantees in transport project. This resulting additional 
market risk is related to the difficulty to assess the willingness of travellers to pay for a new 
infrastructure given the availability of alternative routes with lower costs (e.g. no toll on 
existing routes.  
But even if the risks are supported by the private sector, the project can give a monopolistic 
situation to the private provider (e.g. a bridge). In this case, the amount of demand risk faced 
by the private sector depends on the contractual arrangements for pricing and the duration 
of the concession. The gains from private financing will depend on an effective price 
regulation. 
The exposure of the private sector to risks can also be assessed according to a distinction 
between freestanding facilities and those constituting parts of larger integrated networks 
[Heald (1997)]. For freestanding projects, the transfer of significant risks can be achieved 
which makes credible the threat of bankruptcy for the concessionary. When the assets of the 
project are part of a network, the privately financed link may be vital to network efficiency 
and this will reduce the discipline imposed on the private contractor through bankruptcy 
threat. The same consideration applies for a freestanding infrastructure delivering primary 
public services like water. The private contractor can use the infrastructure as an ''hostage'' 
to obtain more favorable terms from the government. 
The basic difference between the two types of project may induce inefficient behaviour from 
public authorities [Heald and Geaughan (1997)]. As projects yielding benefits capturable in 
the form of user charges are favored it might introduce a sub-optimal change in the 
composition of investment and lead to the realization of project with a low social value. 
Lenders are directly concerned by the consequence of interruption or delay in the 
construction phase which affect the cash-flow streams. The occurrence of construction 
phase risks jeopardize completion of the project and timely repayment of the debt. The 
contractual mechanism designed in the construction and operating phases are implemented 
in order to ensure cash-flow maintenance throughout the project. It may be required to play 
on maturities and currencies to match with the need of the investors. 
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The allocation of risks in infrastructure projects is crucial in the bargaining process. The party 
who ultimately bears a specific risk ought to be the one with a competitive advantage or 
natural predisposition in risk assessment and control, e.g. the government has to bear 
legislative risks. In consequence, the state has to pre-commit to bear non-insurance risks or 
to enforce institutional solutions to imperfect market mechanisms for allocating risks (Credit-
export agencies for political risks, for instance). Otherwise, the cost of doing so may be 
disproportionate in the case where the private sector is less able to control these risks. The 
risk of excessive intervention of the government in the project may also affect the long term 
viability of the project. For instance, additional environmental or safety requirements can 
require additional investment which affect the profitability of the project. This risk of 
opportunistic behaviour by the government which leads to expropriate the investments 
undertaken by the project company might reduce ex ante the incentives of private investors 
to participate to infrastructure project [Laffont-Tirole (1993)]. 
Finally, the residual value risk is relatively important as he has direct consequence on the 
incentives of the private operator to maintain the infrastructure in good running. Indeed, the 
operator's incentives to invest and maintain assets diminish as the date of termination of the 
concession approaches. This effect is strengthened by the specific flow of revenues 
associated to long-term infrastructure project. 
3. An application to public transport infrastructure : the PFI experience in the 
UK 
After the privatization of various public utilities in the UK, it remains capital-intensive 
infrastructure where the final customer is often the public sector, this latter retaining a very 
close interest in the quality and nature of the service, e.g. the health service, roads, 
education, custodial services,... The Private Finance Initiative, the so-called PFI, typically 
corresponds to project financing scheme and introduces a fundamental change in the 
perception of the state role in infrastructure investment in the UK. The public sector now 
purchases directly or indirectly services from the private sector responsible for owning, 
financing and operating the capital asset that is delivering the service, while it was before 
owner of capital assets and direct provider of service. The government is committed to a 
long-term agreement at the time of construction which implies that the present value of the 
financial commitment by the government may be very similar whether the public sector owns 
the asset or not. Indeed, instead of capital spending having a one-off impact in terms of 
public expenditure when the investment occurs, there is a stream of future revenues 
commitment over the lifetime of the service contract entering in public spending into the 
future. Two main requirements have been introduced for PFI schemes: 
i the project has to demonstrate value for money for the taxpayer; 
i the project has to transfer significant risks to the private sector. 
Three potential types of project have been identified. The first category is financially free-
standing projects where the private sector undertakes the project on the basis that costs will 
be recovered entirely through charges for services to the final user (e.g. the tolled Skye 
bridge). The second category corresponds to project where the services are sold to the 
public sector, i.e. the cost of the project is met wholly or mainly through charges form the 
private sector provider to the public sector body which let the contract (e.g. the Fazakerley 
and Bridgend prisons, the Colfox school, roads schemes,...). Finally, there is joint-venture 
project where the cost of the project is met partly from public funds reflecting the social 
benefits of the project and partly from other sources of income, with overall control of the 
project resting with the private sector (e.g. the Docklands Light Railway extension to 
Lewisham, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link). 
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3.1 Case studies of PFI 
Given the long-run nature of infrastructure projects and the slow development of PFI 
programme, empirical evidence is emerging slowly and until now, there is no project which is 
near the termination of the concession contract. However, the development of different 
projects which are now operational or at the end of the construction phase provides 
interesting findings. 
In this section, we discuss some preliminary findings on the development of private provision 
of infrastructure services under PFI in transport infrastructure. We will investigate different 
sectors in order to assess the impact of various infrastructure characteristics (size of the 
relationship-specific investment, complexity of the service,...) on the design and the type of 
contractual agreements between the public sector and the private provider. Moreover, as 
those projects are developed in the same country, we avoid some bias resulting from the 
comparison of different judicial system or from the introduction of additional risks like 
exchange risk. 
For each case we analyze, we try to provide detailed description of transactions and their 
associated governance structure (nature of the contract,...). The data we use come from 
different sources: reports of the National Audit Office [NAO (1997, 1998)] on existing PFI 
projects, public information from governmental department and studies realized by the 
Treasury Task Force for private financing. 
Case 1: The Skye Bridge project 
This project has been undertaken by the Scottish Office Development Department (SODD) 
which has arranged the provision of a tolled road bridge to the Isle of Skye using principles 
of DBFO, i.e. the bridge has been built at the expense of a private sector developer who will 
operate it and receives tolls to recover the costs incurred. The bridge has been opened to 
traffic in October 1995. 
The sequence of events is the following: 
1986 Highland Regional Council feasibility study 
10/1989 Advertisement inviting expressions of interest 
07/1990 Final invitation to tender to three shortlisted bidders 
04/1991 SODD announces the preferred bidder 
12/1991 Signing of the development and concession contract with Skye Bridge Limited 
conditional upon outcome of local public inquiry 
06/1992 Public inquiry report published 
07/1992 Beginning of the construction 
10/1995 {Beginning of the concession period 
10/2022 End of the concession 
After having undertaken feasibility studies of the Skye bridge in 1986 and 1988, SODD with 
the agreement of the Highland Regional Council has decided to chose the private finance 
option. It was expected that the private finance project would provide good value for money 
because: 
i better scope for innovation in the design of the bridge; 
i better optimization of the costing of the project over its full life by transferring 
construction and operation to the private sector; 
i better risks allocation by transferring in particular construction risks to the contractual 
parties best able to manage them or their outcome. 
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After the assessment of the three preferred bids in competition, SODD has chosen the 
Miller-Dywidag's bid. Following the signing of the contract in December 1991, a company 
owned by the winning consortium5, Skye Bridge Limited (SBL) became responsible for the 
development and operation of the bridge. Under the development contract, SBL had to 
secure the design and construction of the bridge and its approach roads to the SODD's 
specified technical requirement within a pre-specified period of 3 years form 
commencement. the SODD makes a fixed contribution of pounds 6 millions (1988 prices) to 
meet the expected costs of the approach roads. Moreover, as a result of the 1992 public 
inquiry implying changes in the design of the crossing, SODD compensates SBL by pounds 
1,2 million (1988 prices) for the extra costs incurred. In addition, SODD makes an additional 
transfer of pounds 1,7 million (1988 prices) to compensate for construction delays due to the 
statutory procedure. SBL has contracted with Miller-Dywidag for the construction of the 
bridge. SBL is also responsible for the financing of the project secured only on the revenues 
and assets of the project itself which does not include the bridge itself which remains the 
property of the Secretary of State throughout the concession. The construction contract is a 
fixed price contract transferring the risk of cost overruns to Miller-Dywidag. The SODD 
delegates the monitoring of the construction phase of the project to Highland Regional 
Council. This latter has sub-contracted monitoring to engineering advisers. Each contracting 
party is responsible for the financial consequence of any change he proposes in the design 
of the project. 
The financing structure of the project includes debt and equity in a proportion of 98:2. The 
equity injection by Miller-Dywidag reduces the risks of the lenders that it will not be repaid 
and provides a guarantee of commitment to the success of the project. The Bank of America 
acts as a direct lender. 
The concession contract assigns to SBL the rights to charge tolls for traffic using crossing. 
The contract includes a fixed-price mechanism, i.e. the tolls can be increased in function of 
the RPI, with annual increases after the opening of the bridge. However, if tolls revenue falls 
bellow a sum corresponding to some 450000 vehicles crossing a year (i.e. the 1990 traffic 
level), SBL can increase tolls up to 30% more than the rate of inflation. SODD has 
negotiated with SBL to charge tolls at no more than 1991 ferry fares in real terms. SBL has 
obtained in compensation a longer concession period. As the period is defined on the 
promoter worst case traffic projections, the volume risk is very low. The concession contract 
includes a semi-variable term for the operation of the bridge. The contract requires SBL to 
cease collecting tolls as soon as they have achieved the pre-determined ''require net present 
value'' or 27 years after opening the bridge, even if by this date the company have not 
achieved the target toll revenue. 
SBL sub-contracts the operation of the bridge to Miller-Dywidag. SBL is responsible for the 
maintenance of the bridge during the concession period and for remedy in the approach 
roads during the first years. Moreover, SBL has to provided a maintenance bond of \pounds\ 
250000 to cover any dispute over the standard of maintenance. Finally, SBL has to hand the 
bridge back to the Secretary of State in a fit condition for the design life of 120 years. 
In case of default, SODD will gain control on the bridge and take over the responsibility for 
collecting tolls. SODD can look for a new concessionary for the remainder of the contract, 
SBL being entitled to receive all sums obtained directly by SODD from collecting tolls and 
the full consideration received from the new concessionary net of the costs borne by SODD 
to manage these changes. 
The risks transferred to the private sector are the following: surveys and investigations risks, 
design risk, construction risk, hand back condition risk, bridge maintenance and operation 
risk. Some risks are shared between the private sector and the public sector: traffic or 
5 The members of the consortium are: a joint venture between Miller Civil Engineering Ltd and Dyckerhoff \& Widmann AG, and 
Bank of America International Financial Corporation.
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volume risk, inflation risk, changes in corporation tax rates risk, force majeure risk and latent 
and inherent defects risk. Finally, they are risks borne by SODD: specific legislation risk, 
planning risk, force majeure risk and maintenance of approach roads risk. The transfer of 
risks to the private sector concerns essentially the design and construction of the bridge and 
the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure. The demand risk is shared between the 
private and the public sector while SBL is in monopolistic position since the suppression of 
the ferry service managed by a public company. 
The recourse to the private sector seems to have generated important new transaction costs 
to the public sector related to development, negotiation and surpervision of the contract 
(advisers's fee representing about 7% of the construction costs ). Moreover, the public 
sector participation has been higher than expected due to design changes and delays which 
have give rise to payment of compensation to the private operator. Note also that the 
recourse to the private sector has increased the financing cost of the project, i.e. the loan 
stock for the Skye Bridge had a 2 per cent risk margin over comparable gilts 
Case 2: Road projects 
The Highways Agency (HA), an executive agency of the Department of Transport, has 
undertaken four road projects under DBFO contractual scheme: 
i the M1-A1 link road near Leeds 
i the A1(M) widening between Alconburgand Peterborough 
i the A419/A417 between Swinden and Gloucester 
i the A69 between Carlisle and Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. 
In such road projects, the asset is provide by the private sector, the provider retains 
ownership and contracts to supply free entry to traffic for a pre-specified period of 30 years. 
The provider is remunerated directly from the government, not the user, in the form of a fixed 
fee per vehicle (shadow tolls), which is monitored at various points on the road. The 
government pays directly for the use of the service by the public, rather than for the provision 
of road services. 
The sequence of events for this first tranche of DBFO is the following: 
12/1993 Announcement that the first DBFO roads contract were to be let within 18 
months 
08/1994 Advertissement of competition for the first tranche of 4 contracts 
01/1995 Following pre-qualification, 4 consortia were invited to tender for each project 
10/1995 Invitation for final offer and announcement of the preferred bidder 
03/1996 Signing of the contract 
04/1996 Beginning of the construction 
05/1997 - 
03/1999
Beginning of the concession period 
05/2027 - 
03/2029
End of the concession 
The HA's objectives for this first tranche of DBFO are the maximization of value for money 
by allocating risks appropriately between the public and the private sector, the promotion of 
innovation, the preservation of the environment and to test the response of the market to 
private finance road contracts. To reduce the statutory risks, the projects were selected from 
those which they had taken through public inquiries in the conventional manner. It limits the 
expected scope for innovation in the design of the project as bidders have to meet specified 
technical requirements. 
From the pre-qualification submissions, HA were able to select four consortia for each 
project, no consortium being invited to bid for more than two projects. from the short-listed 
bidders, the HA chooses a preferred bidder for each project. In order to maintain potential 
competition during the negotiation with the preferred bidder, HA has asked to the other 
short-listed bidders to keep their bids on the table. For the M1-A1 project, the winning 
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consortium is Yorkshire Link Limited6. The contract implies the provision of a new motorway 
and the operation and maintenance of the route for 30 years. The date of expected opening 
is March 1999 and the net present value of expected payments equal to pounds 232 
millions. For the A1(M) road project, the winning consortium is Road Management Group7.
As in the previous contract, the concessionary is responsible for the construction, operation 
and maintenance of the route for 30 years but is also responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of the existing A1 until completion. The road will be opened in October 1998 
and the net present value of expected payments equal to pounds 154 millions. For 
A419/A417 road project, including construction of new road but also up-grading of existing 
one and operation during 30 years, the winning consortium is also Road Management 
Group. The date of expected opening is March 1998 and the net present value of expected 
payments equal to pounds 232 millions. Finally, the A69 project road were awarded to Road 
Link8. The project includes specific city's bypass construction and the maintenance and 
operation of the whole road during 30 years. The date of expected opening is May 1997 and 
the net present value of expected payments equal to pounds 62 millions. 
HA concluded direct agreement with the funders of each consortium. This agreement gives 
the funder the opportunity to step in the case of supplier default and to replace the supplier 
with a substitute who fulfils the supplier's original obligations under the contract. The 
structure of the construction and concession contracts is similar for the four road project. The 
duration of the concession is 30 years. The length of the contract integrates factors such as 
the typical life of the road pavement (40 years), the availability of long-term debt (perceived 
as being a maximum of 25 years), the transfer of delay risk to the private sector,... The 
payment structure is based on shadow toll scheme, i.e. the concessionary is paid by HA for 
each vehicle kilometer travelled on the concessionary's road. There are up to four bands of 
''shadow toll'' rates. This mechanism allows bidders to limit their downside exposure in the 
event of traffic being less than expected, and also limit the HA's financial exposure, since the 
rate in the top band is zero. Payment are also adjusted to reflect performance of the road in 
terms of safety and congestion. 
HA delegates to an external adviser the monitoring of the construction phase and operation 
of the new sections of the road until the completion agreement is issued. The operation and 
maintenance phase of each contract is monitored by a department's representative. The 
contract includes a mechanism of penalty points in the event of minor breach by the 
concessionary. behind a certain penalty points threshold, HA can terminate the contract 
without compensation. One advantage of this system is to disclose earlier information on the 
progress of the project to the shareholders and the lenders which can react more quickly to 
restructure the firm. Moreover the concessionary has incentives to minimize such breaches. 
In case of fundamental breaches of the contract, the operator may be removed from the 
project without compensation. A specific agreement with the lenders provides some 
guarantees to the lenders in case of operator's default. the lenders benefit from a step-in-
period to appoint another operator, approved by HA, for the remainder of the life of the 
contract. To prevent default during the construction of the new road, the contractor has to 
provide a performance guarantee bond. Except in the case of force majeure where only 
debit is repaid, the concessionary is fully compensated in the event of HA's default. The 
compensation is calculated to repay the debt borrowed by the company to finance the 
project and to compensate the equity providers. 
At the end of the contract, the roads revert to the public sector. Specific clauses ensure that 
at the hand-back date, the road satisfies some standards, e.g. a given residual life for each 
element of the project road. 
6 The consortium includes Trafalgar House and Belfour Beatty
7 The consortium includes Ame, Brown & Root, Dragadas and Alfred Mc Alpine
8 The consortium includes Henry Boat, Christiani & Neilsen, Cogelarimpresit, Morrison, Pell Frischman and ASTM-SINA
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The contract includes some adjustment's mechanism to compensate the operator for the 
effects of reduction in traffic resulting from the introduction of user paid tolls which could be 
implemented latter on when electronic tolling system would be operational. If HA modifies 
the design of the project during the life of the contract, he has to modify the tolls in a 
appropriate way or to transfer a lump-sum payment to the operator. The shadow tolls system 
implies an accurate traffic measurement which is undertaken by the operator. HA will check 
the operator's measurement and sets some initial parameters for the accuracy of the traffic 
counts. 
The risks transferred to the private sector are the following: latent and inherent defects risk, 
design risk, construction risk, delivery and timing risk, hand back condition risk, maintenance 
and operation risk, general legislative risk. Some risks are shared between the private sector 
and the public sector: traffic or volume risk, protester action risk, force majeure risk. Finally, 
they are risks borne by SODD: specific legislation risk, planning risk. As in the previous 
project, the transfer of risks to the private sector concerns essentially the construction of the 
road and operation and maintenance of the infrastructure. 
Beyond the risk allocation analysis, additional insights can be identified about the contracting 
costs of these projects. Compared to traditional procurement the tendering process is time 
consuming for HA and bidding costs higher than expected. Some unexpected delays at the 
earlier stage of the procurement stage have postponed the beginning of the construction 
phase. In terms of transaction costs, the great bulk of the costs borne by HA is related to 
advisers' fees. The consortia's bidding costs for each project were high by comparison with 
conventional road procurement. This is largely because such contracts differ from 
conventional construction contract for roads project (financial scheme,...). To assess value 
for money of DBFO roads contracts, HA prepared public sector comparators for each four 
projects. Depending on the assumptions on the discount rate, one or two of the four projects 
have a poorer value for money than the public sector comparator. The project generating the 
higher value for money are the two projects involving the highest proportion of road 
construction compared with operation and maintenance costs. 
3.2 Insights from project financing experience in the UK 
In the preceding section, we analyze in detail two transport project financings, i.e. the Skye 
bridge project and Roads projects.. We can point out the following elements. First, 
regardless of the type of projects, the transfer of risks to the private sector mainly concerns 
the construction, the operation and the maintenance of the physical assets. Moreover, the 
length of the contract seems to be relatively independent on the lifetime of the infrastructure. 
Second, the transfer of important risks during the construction phase to the private sector 
allows to reduce the construction period and to introduce cost reduction innovation in the 
design of the infrastructure. Third, the transaction costs for the implementation of private 
finance are relatively high [measured in terms of staff costs, advisers and external 
consultants fee]. Finally, the transfer of the realization of these infrastructures to the private 
sector has allowed to have recourse more often to fixed price contract, rather than cost-plus 
contract used more often in public ownership. 
At this stage, we want to complete our analysis by introducing additional information on other 
PFI cases. These latter cases are the following: the extension of the existing railway of 4,2 
km from Island Gardens to Lewisham (Light Railway) and the provision of new trains for the 
Northern Line of London Underground (Northern Line Trains). In order to emphasize the 
main results of our case studies analysis, we firstly describe the main project characteristics 
of the different PFI in Table 2. We distinguish between three dimensions: the size of the 
investment, the characteristics of the infrastructure services and the potential state 
contribution to the financing of the project. 
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Table 2 : Project characteristics of various PFI 
 Capital cost of the 
project ( GBP millions) 
Characteristics of infrastructure 
services 
Contribution of 
the state to 
project financing 
Road 
 (4 contracts) 
70 in average i Indirect payment by the 
governement 
i Simple specification of 
infrastructure services 
No
Bridge 24 i User payment 
i Complex specification of design 
and construction requirements 
Yes 
 Light 
Railway 
20 i Direct payment by the 
governement and user payment
i Complex specification of design 
and construction requirements 
Yes 
Northern 
Line Trains 
400 i Direct payment by the 
governement 
i Complex specification of design 
and construction requirements 
No
The sample of contracts concerns projects from various level of investment. The size of the 
investment is important as all assets of these project are relationship-specific. We observe 
that direct payment by the users are relatively rare and the project differs on the level of 
uncertainty and complexity either during the construction phase or the operation phase. 
Finally, public sector intervention in the financing of the project is not the general situation. 
Given the characteristics of the project we have identified, we can analyze the contractual 
design of PFI projects. The compensation scheme defined in the contract gives informations 
on the degree of completeness of the project [see Crocker and Reynolds (1993)]. The fixed 
price with economic price adjustment scheme uses specific labor or materials indices to 
determine prices according to an agreed-upon compensation formula. The flexibility of such 
a contract depends on the number of the indexed categories and is constrained by the 
requirement that the contingencies and the formula must be explicitly prespecified. The fixed 
price mechanism introduces adjustment which depends on the general evolution of the 
economy (retail price index, for instance) and not some project specificities. The not-to-
exceed price defines a lower or an upper bound on the price variation. This mechanism 
introduces more flexibility as the price can vary in a larger interval and hence, can be 
described as less complete than the preceding one. Finally, the fixed-price incentive with 
escalation clause conditions the payment to the achievement of pre-defined requirements. 
The length before opening and the share of the advisers fees in the cost of capital provide 
information on the ex ante contracting costs9 for the project. The higher the advisers fees 
share and the longer the period before opening, the more exhaustive the agreement will be. 
In this case, we can infer that the contract is more complete. The renegotiation interval gives 
some gross information on the way the renegotiation process is constrained in the contract. 
To limit the nature and the scope of renegotiation, parties may restrict either the set of 
permissible adjustments or the period at which renegotiation can occur. On the other hand, 
parties may attempt to increase the scope for renegotiation when the specification of the 
infrastructure services is complex and uncertain. 
9
 In terms of transaction costs, we have to note that the private consortium incurs significant bidding costs. If these costs are
too high, it will deter private bidder to participate to the invitation to tender. This deterrent effect can be reduced by the 
implementation of road-test projects to identify the commercial viability before issuing formal invitation to tender. In some cases 
public authorities commit to reimburse part or the totality of the costs incurred by the unselected private bidding consortium.
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As shown in table 3, we observe that the level of transaction costs seems to be relatively 
independent of the complexity of the project, indicating that the technical characteristics for 
projects are not the main driver of transaction costs.  
Table 3 : Contractual characteristics of PFI projects 
 Duration Compensation 
scheme 
Risks transferred to 
the private sector 
Length 
before 
opening 
Advisers fees 
relative to the 
cost of capital 
Renegotiation 
interval 
Road 
(4 contracts) 
30 years Not to exceed 
price 
i Design, construction 
i Delivery, timing 
i Maintenance, operation 
i Hand back, latent 
51 months 3,9% 3 years 
Bridge Up to 27 
years 
Not to exceed 
price 
i Survey, design, 
construction 
i Delivery, timing 
i Maintenance, operation 
i Hand back, latent 
72 months 7,1% 1 year 
Light 
Railway 
24,5 years Fixed price i Design, construction 
i Delivery, timing 
i Maintenance, operation 
i Hand back 
62 months n.a. n.a. 
Northern 
Line Trains 
20 years Fixed price 
incentive with 
escalation clause 
i Design, construction 
i Delivery, timing 
i Maintenance, operation 
i Hand back, latent 
39 months n.a. n.a. 
This result is confirmed by a study of the World Bank [Klein and al. (1996)] showing that the 
level of transaction costs depends on the policy environment and on some learning effects 
by government officials rather than on the characteristics of the project. 
We observe that the risks transferred to the private sector are also independent of the 
project: design and construction risks, maintenance and operation of the infrastructure are 
the more important risks borne by the private contractor. This issue is related to the 
allocation of the residual value risk when assets have an expected useful life beyond the 
term defined in the contract. As infrastructures developed under PFI contracts are still highly 
specific assets with no existing competitive markets and are dependent on public sector 
decisions for contract renewal, a wrong allocation of this risk will affect the investment 
decisions of the private consortium during the lifetime of the concession and lead to higher 
price. It might be worthwhile to transfer the risk to the private sector when this asset can be 
traded on a secondhand market. In this case, the private operator has adequate incentives 
to maintain the assets, for instance, in order to improve their prospects for extending the 
original contract. 
In each case, the private contractor is immune from demand or volume risk. However, we 
have to make some distinction between contract where the payment mechanism depends on 
the volume of usage rather than availability of a service and where the terms of the contract 
is endogenous. When the payment mechanism is based on volume rather than availability, it 
can imply an excessive risk transfer to the private sector if the volume of usage is largely 
outside the control of the private sector. In addition, in such a contractual specification based 
on traffic volumes might provide bad incentives to private consortia and to the government. 
Private consortia will be induced to be over-optimistic in predicting traffic growth in order to 
obtain the market. Such a ''winner's curse'' may generate pressure for the government to 
extent the length of the concession in case of trouble, returning the demand risk to the public 
sector. Note that this strategy of underbidding or lowballing will depend on the lobbying 
powers of firms since it will affect the terms in which the contract will be renegotiated in the 
future. On the other hand, the behaviour of the government with respect to the availability of 
competing services will crucially affect the tender prices. In practice, the payment 
mechanism for the prisons and school contract as well as the Northern Line Trains project 
depend on the availability of the service while the road contracts are based on traffic volume 
subject to some cap limiting downward variations. The light Railway contract combines both 
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payment mechanisms. Finally, the Skye bridge payment mechanism is also function of the 
traffic volume but with a variable contract length. The recourse to such an endogenous 
concession length may be an effective contractual alternative10 to avoid some inefficiencies 
in the allocation of risks between the public and the private sector due to a too large 
exposure to volume risk. This contractual mechanism is similar to the Least Present Value 
Auctions (LPVA) proposed by Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (1997). The LPVA scheme is 
designed as follows: the concession is awarded to the consortium asking for the least 
present value of user fee revenues for a given traffic structure and will end up as soon as the 
present value of user fee is equal to the concession-holder's bid. This scheme reduces the 
demand risk borne by the private consortium providing an insurance for the bad state of 
nature but decrease by the same token the incentive of the consortium to invest in demand-
increasing features or in operating cost-reducing activities since it does not provide any 
additional profits to the consortium but reduces the length of the concession. 
4. Conclusion 
The design of an optimal contractual scheme for PFI projects has to take into account the 
close integration between the two phases of the project, i.e. the design-construction and 
operation of the infrastructure. This preliminary analysis of the recent development of private 
infrastructure initiative in the UK shows that the gains from the recourse to the private sector 
are essentially concentrated on the design and construction phase. There is no real transfer 
of demand or volume risk excepted for the roads contracts. In a study of the private 
participation in infrastructure projects (in particular, the construction and management of a 
road tunnel) in Australia, Mills confirmed the result we have derived for the UK: the 
agreement between the government and the tunnel company eliminates for the company 
virtually all the revenue or demand risk [Mills (1991)]. Even if the transfer of operating risks 
to the private consortium might increase the price paid for the infrastructure service, the 
public sector should try to design a contractual mechanism minimizing the lifetime costs and 
benefits of the concession. Indeed, the optimal contract will not merely select a total amount 
of risk to give the best balance between incentives and expected contract cost but has also 
to distribute optimally the risks between the two phases of the project: the construction and 
operation phases. The contractual arrangement we have observed may depart from an 
optimal balance between phases, by placing major risk on the private consortium only during 
the construction phase. Such a contract may be justified by the characteristics of an 
infrastructure project: 
i high construction costs versus lower operating and maintenance costs; 
i demand for the infrastructure services hard to estimate and not directly controllable by 
the private operator. 
However, the insurance against demand or revenue risks might distort the incentive of the 
operator, especially when the different stakeholders are not directly concerned by the 
performance of each phase of the project. In addition, when there is no substitute for the 
infrastructure services  or when this new infrastructure is part of an integrated network, the 
private consortium can behave opportunistically in order to obtain a higher monopoly rents. 
Hence, the efficiency of the concession contract will depend on the ability of the government 
to implement an effective regulatory mechanism. 
The recourse to the private sector for the provision of infrastructures services has modified 
the nature of the contractual arrangements. Whereas public provisions of infrastructure may 
be considered as a vertical integration with construction and operation often organized within 
the public sector, private financing projects are governed by long-term contracts. The private 
sector participation transforms the role of the public sector from being an owner of capital 
10
 The construction and operation of the Queen Elizabeth II (known as the Dartford Bridge) and the Second Severn Crossing 
use the same contractual structure. The concession was designed to end up after a specified number of years or as soon as 
the toll revenue is sufficient to repay principal and interest of the debt. 
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assets and direct provider of services into a purchaser of service through a long-term 
agreement.
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